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ツィッターでヒンティカのことが話題になった。
ヒンティカ派の仕事は、中世哲学史家から批判され、その批判は妥当とのこと。
Hintikka, Jaako.
Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973
Medieval Theories of Modality (SEP)
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-medieval/
2月3日読了。ヒンティカ派の御大、Knuuttila氏によるもの。
情報量が多すぎて、とてもまとめられない。
Aristotle on Modality
Abstract
[Stephen Makin] Aristotle draws two sets of distinctions in Metaphysics 9.2, first between non-rational and rational capacities, and second between one way and two way capacities. He then argues for three claims: [A] if a capacity is rational, then it is a two way capacity [B] if a capacity is non-rational, then it is a one way capacity [C] a two way capacity is not indifferently related to the opposed outcomes to which it can give rise I provide explanations of Aristotle's terminology, and of how [A]-[C] should be understood. I then offer a set of arguments which are intended to show that the Aristotelian claims are plausible. \\\ [Nicholas Denyer] In De Caelo 1: 11-12 Aristotle argued that whatever is and always will be true is necessarily true. His argument works, once we grant him the highly plausible principle that if something is true, then it can be false if and only if it can come to be false. For example, assume it true that the sun is and always will be hot. No proposition of this form can ever come to be false. Hence this proposition cannot be false. Hence it is necessarily true, and so too is anything that follows from it. In particular, it is necessarily true that the sun is hot. Moreover, if the sun not only is and always will be hot, but also always has been, then it follows by similar reasoning that the sun not only cannot now fail to be hot, but also never could have failed. Anything everlastingly true is therefore, in the strictest sense of the term, necessarily true.
分析哲学の手法。
